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Highlights
•	 Following	the	procedure	introduced	by	the	TEN-E	Regulation,	thirteen	power	
and	gas	infrastructure	projects	from	the	list	of	“projects	of	common	interest”	
have	 recently	 received	 a	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	decision.	These	 deci-
sions	include	twelve	coordinated	decisions	by	national	regulatory	authorities	
and	one	decision	by	 the	Agency	 for	 the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	
(ACER).	
•	 For	most	projects,	the	countries	that	are	expected	to	apply	part	of	the	invest-
ment	on	their	own	territory	are	also	a	net	beneficiary	of	the	project.	In	one	
case,	 the	 cost	 benefit	 analysis	 indicates	 that	 the	 costs	 clearly	 outweigh	 the	
benefits	 for	one	of	 the	 involved	countries	 (i.e.	net	 loser).	The	decision	has	
been	to	compensate	this	country.	In	three	cases,	countries	have	agreed	to	a	
cross-border	cost	allocation	with	compensation,	even	if	none	of	the	involved	
countries	is	expected	to	be	a	net	loser.
•	 In	this	brief,	we	determine	the	extent	to	which	this	first	series	of	cross-border	
cost	 allocation	 decisions	 complies	 with	 the	 TEN-E	 Regulation,	 ACER’s	
Recommendation,	 and	FSR’s	 recommendations.	We	 find	 that	 the	 expected	
improvement	in	cross-border	cost	allocation	decisions	is	ongoing,	but	the	gap	
between	practice	and	recommendations	remains.				
•	 To	reduce	 the	gap,	we	have	updated	our	recommendations	 into	six	 lessons	
learned:	 [1]	 revisit	 the	 significance	 threshold	 and	 the	 interaction	with	 the	
Connecting	Europe	Facility,	[2]	promote	the	good	practice	of	using	market	
tests	 to	 improve	 the	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 decision,	 [3]	 require	 a	
complete	cross-border	cost	allocation	decision,	[4]	continue	to	use	the	results	
of	the	cost-benefit	analysis	to	facilitate	innovative	cross-border	cost	allocation	
decisions,	[5]	continue	coordinating	these	decisions	for	strongly	interacting	
projects,	and	[6]	start	including	binding	commitments	in	the	decisions,	espe-
cially	with	respect	to	the	commissioning	date.
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Introduction
In	October	2013,	the	first	list	of	132	electricity	and	107	gas	pro-
jects	of	common	interest1	was	adopted.	These	projects	are	stra-
tegically	important	to	achieve	the	EU	energy	and	climate	policy	
objectives,	and	they	typically	involve	several	Member	States	as	
investor	 and/or	 beneficiary.	The	 TEN-E	 Regulation2	 tries	 to	
accelerate	 the	 development	 of	 these	 important	 projects	 with	
several	 regulatory	measures,	 including	 a	 procedure	 whereby	
national	regulatory	authorities	have	to	agree	on	the	cost	alloca-
tion	of	 sufficiently	mature	projects	within	 six	months,	 and	 if	
they	cannot,	the	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regula-
tors	(ACER)	is	expected	to	decide	on	their	behalf.	
1.	 	Commission	 delegated	Regulation	 (EU)	No	 1391/2013	 of	 14	October	
2013	amending	Regulation	 (EU)	No	347/2013	of	 the	European	Parlia-
ment	and	of	the	Council	on	guidelines	for	trans-European	energy	infra-
structure	as	regards	the	Union	list	of	projects	of	common	interest
2.	 	Regulation	(EU)	No	347/2013	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	
Council	of	17	April	2013	on	guidelines	for	trans-European	energy	infra-
structure	and	repealing	Decision	No	1364/2006/EC	and	amending	Reg-
ulations	(EC)	No	713/2009,	(EC)	No	714/2009	and	(EC)	No	715/2009.
Thirteen	projects	of	common	interest	have	meanwhile	received	
such	 a	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 decision:	 twelve	 coordi-
nated	decisions	by	national	regulatory	authorities,	one	decision	
by	ACER	because	 the	national	 regulatory	authorities	did	not	
agree	within	 the	 6	months	deadline.	As	many	more	of	 these	
decisions	will	follow	in	the	coming	months	and	years	under	the	
TEN-E	Regulation,	this	policy	brief	reviews	the	current	prac-
tice3,	and	discusses	the	extent	to	which	the	first	series	of	deci-
sions	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	TEN-E	Regulation,	
with	ACER’s	Recommendation4	and	with	the	FSR	recommen-
dations	included	in	our	previous	policy	brief5.
3.	 	The	European	Commission	provided	 its	first	 evaluation	of	 the	 cross-
border	cost	allocations	at	the	26th	meeting	of	the	Madrid	Forum.
4.	 	Recommendation	of	the	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regula-
tors	No	07/2013	of	25	September	2013	regarding	the	cross-border	cost	
allocation	requests	submitted	in	the	framework	of	the	first	union	list	of	
electricity	and	gas	projects	of	common	interest.
5.	 	Meeus,	L.,	He,	X.,	2014.	Guidance	for	Project	Promoters	and	Regulators	
for	the	Cross-Border	Cost	Allocation	of	Projects	of	Common	Interest.	
Florence	School	of	Regulation	Policy	Brief	Issue	2014/02,	January	2014.
Figure	1:	map	of	electricity	(underlined)	and	gas	projects	of	common	interest	according	to	their	decision	to	compensate	or	not
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This	brief	is	divided	into	two	sections.	In	the	first	section,	we	
map	the	first	thirteen	projects	that	received	a	cross-border	cost	
allocation	decision	under	the	TEN-E	Regulation.	In	the	second	
section,	we	list	our	six	most	important	observations	and	pre-
sent	the	lessons	learned	for	each	of	them.
1. The first series of cross-border cost 
allocation decisions
In	 this	 section,	 we	 map	 the	 thirteen	 projects	 of	 common	
interest	that	have	received	a	cross-border	cost	allocation	deci-
sion.	
We	distinguish	three	types	of	decisions	(Figure	1).	In	nine	pro-
jects,	none	of	the	countries	that	are	expected	to	apply	part	of	
the	investment	to	their	own	territory	have	costs	that	outweigh	
their	benefits,	and	they	have	agreed	that	each	country	pays	for	
the	assets	on	its	own	territory	(red	color:	“no	loser,	no	com-
pensation”).	In	one	project,	there	is	a	net	loser,	and	the	cross-
border	cost	allocation	agreement	includes	a	payment	from	the	
net	beneficiaries	of	the	project	towards	this	net	loser	for	part	
of	 the	 investment	 cost	 (green	 color:	 “loser,	 compensation”).	
In	three	projects,	countries	have	agreed	to	a	cross-border	cost	
allocation	 with	 compensation,	 even	 if	 none	 of	 the	 involved	
countries	 is	expected	to	be	a	net	 loser	(blue	color:	“no	loser,	
compensation”).
In	the	annex	to	this	brief,	we	provide	a	description	of	the	pro-
jects,	 and	 their	 respective	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 deci-
sions	based	on	publicly	available	information.	Note	that	most	
decisions	are	only	published	 in	native	 languages,	 so	possible	
errors	in	the	translation	or	interpretation	are	ours.
2. Lessons learned from the first series of 
cross-border cost allocation decisions
In	what	follows,	we	derive	the	lessons	learned	by	considering	to	
whom	the	costs	can	be	allocated,	what	costs	are	being	allocated,	
and	how	to	allocate	them.
2.1 To whom are costs to be allocated?
The	spirit	of	 the	TEN-E	Regulation	is	 to	 implement	the	ben-
eficiaries	 pay	principle.	The	 implementation	of	 this	 principle	
has	been	simplified	by	ACER’s	Recommendation,	which	intro-
duces	a	significance threshold	of	10%	of	the	total	net	positive	
benefits.
	
[1] Significance threshold 
Five projects of common interest (i.e. PCI 4.2.1, PCI 4.2.2, PCI 
4.4.1, PCI 5.2 and PCI 5.3) refer to ACER’s significance threshold 
to justify their cross-border cost allocation decision. 
There are sound economic reasons to apply a significance 
threshold: significance is a proxy6 for certainty and it makes 
sense to allocate costs only to countries that will benefit with 
sufficient certainty; involving many small beneficiaries in a 
coordinated cross-border cost allocation decision can be overly 
complex from a transaction cost perspective.
In practice, we observe that the threshold is also used to argue 
for EU funding, especially in projects where the benefits are dis-
persed over many small beneficiaries. In principle this is a valid 
argument, but the (unintended) consequence is that it opens 
the door to many EU funding requests, while the funding that is 
currently available in the Connecting Europe Facility is relatively 
limited. This fund has also not been set-up to deal with the con-
sequences of this significance threshold.
Recommendation [1] Revisit the significance threshold and 
the interaction with the Connecting Europe Facility (or avoid 
that it is misused to justify an incomplete cross-border cost allo-
cation, see Recommendation [3])
2.2 What costs are to be allocated?
Following	 the	TEN-E	Regulation,	 the	 efficiently	 incurred	 costs	
of	projects	of	common	interest	shall	be	borne	by	those	Member	
States	to	which	the	project	provides	a	net	positive	impact,	insofar	
as	the	costs	are	not	covered	by	congestion rents or other reve-
nues.	Gas	projects	have	to	demonstrate	that	they	are	not	commer-
cially	viable	with	a	market	test,	whereas	electricity	projects	do	not.
[2] Commercial revenues 
In four projects of common interest (i.e. PCI 5.3, PCI 6.1.1, PCI 
8.2.4 and PCI 8.5) the commercial revenue of each project has 
been used to improve the cross-border cost allocation decision.
The projects require regulatory approval because they are com-
mercially non-viable, but that does not mean that they do not 
have a commercial value. Commercial revenues are simulated 
in the cost benefit analysis, which can be complemented by a 
market test, and then used in the coordinated decision of the 
involved regulators. This should become common practice for 
all projects.
Recommendation [2] Promote the good practice of using 
market tests to improve the cross-border cost allocation decision
6.	 Note	that	alternative	implementations	of	the	significance	threshold	might	
be	conceived:	e.g.	a	proxy	for	likelihood	based	on	statistical	methods.	
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Moreover,	the	TEN-E	Regulation	does	not	oblige	the	national	
regulatory	authorities	to	allocate	the	full	cost	of	a	project.	They	
can	agree	to	rely	on	the	Connecting Europe Facility	for	part	
of	the	costs,	and	reconsider	their	cross-border	cost	allocation	
according	to	the	pending	EU	funding	decision.
[3] Connecting Europe Facility
Seven projects (i.e. PCI 4.2.1, PCI 4.2.2, PCI 4.4.1, PCI 5.3, PCI 6.1.1, 
PCI 8.2.3 and PCI 8.2.4) have an incomplete cross-border cost allo-
cation decision because they rely on a request for funding from 
the Connecting Europe Facility, the result of which is still pending. 
The consequence is that the final decision is delayed and 
approximate because not all EU funding requests will be 
granted. This is unfortunate because the aim of the TEN-E Regu-
lation is to expedite projects that are strategically important for 
the EU energy and climate policy objectives. 
Recommendation [3] Require a complete cross-border cost 
allocation decision (considering the case with and without EU 
funding, and the case with and without commercial revenues)
2.3 How are costs to be allocated?
Following	 the	 ACER	 and	 FSR	 recommendations,	 the	 min-
imum standard	is	to	compensate	likely	net	losers	based	on	the	
results	of	the	cost-benefit	analysis.	However,	as	argued	in	our	
previous	work,	countries	can	have	an	interest	in	going	beyond	
this	 minimum	 standard	 to	 improve	 the	 commitment	 of	 all	
involved	in	the	project.
[4] Minimum standard
Most projects apply the minimum standard (i.e. Figure 1: red and 
green), except for three projects (i.e. Figure 1: blue) in which the 
involved parties have agreed to go beyond this standard based 
on the cost benefit analysis. However, some concerns have 
been expressed about the quality of the ad-hoc method that 
has been used to analyze the first list of projects of common 
interest. For a discussion on the method, please refer to our pre-
vious work7 on cost-benefit analysis.
Recommendation [4] Continue to use the results of the cost-
benefit analysis to design innovative cross-border cost alloca-
tion decisions
Following	the	FSR	recommendations,	strongly	complementary	
projects	should	be	defined	as	a	single	project	and	cost	alloca-
tion	decisions	for	interacting projects should have extensive 
coordination.
[5] Coordination of strongly interacting projects
In three projects (i.e. PCI 6.1.1, PCI 8.2.3 and PCI 8.2.4), the 
interaction between projects has been acknowledged and 
considered in the corresponding cross-border cost allocation 
decisions. Based on the publicly available information, it is dif-
ficult to assess if all strongly interacting projects are covered. 
As suggested in our previous work on the topic, this informa-
tion should be provided by an improved cost benefit analysis 
method.
Recommendation [5] Continue coordinating cross-border 
cost allocation decisions for strongly interacting projects
Following	 the	 FSR	 recommendations,	 the	 cross-border	 cost	
allocation	decisions	could	be	formalized	as	a	binding	contract	
between	the	involved	parties.
[6] Binding contract
There are four projects (i.e. Figure 1: green and blue) that have 
a cross-border cost allocation decision that includes compensa-
tion. As far as we know, these projects did not make this compen-
sation conditional to the delivery of the project on the expected 
commissioning date, which could have been considered. Also 
for the projects that do not include compensation, it could be 
opportune to formalize the commitment of the involved parties, 
especially with respect to the commissioning date.
Recommendation [6] Start including binding commitments 
in cross-border cost allocation decisions, especially with respect 
to the commissioning date
Annex: First thirteen cross-border cost 
allocation decisions
In	this	annex	to	the	policy	brief,	we	provide	a	description	for	
each	project,	discussing	what	 the	project	 comprises,	how	 the	
costs	have	been	allocated	among	the	concerned	Member	States	
and	what	has	been	the	main	motivation	for	that	allocation	(see	
the	mapping	below).	Note	 that	most	decisions	 are	only	pub-
lished	in	native	languages,	so	possible	errors	in	the	translation	
or	interpretation	are	ours.
7.	 Meeus,	L.,	von	der	Fehr,	N.H.,	Azevedo,	I.,	He,	X.,	Olmos,	L.,	Glachant,	
J.M.,	2013.	Cost	Benefit	Analysis	in	the	Context	of	the	Energy	Infrastruc-
ture	Package.	Florence	School	of	Regulation	Policy	Brief,	Issue	2013/02.	
January	2013.	
	 Keyaerts,	 N.,	 Glachant,	 J.M.,	 2014.	 Cost-benefit	 analysis	 for	 gas-infra-
structure	 projects.	 Florence	 School	 of	 Regulation	 Policy	 Brief,	 Issue	
2014/03.	February	2014.
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9 projects with “No loser, no compensation”
PCI 4.2.1 Latvian-Estonian electricity interconnector 
between Kilingi-Nömme and Riga (BEMIP electricity)
Project: The	 project	 comprises	 a	 210	 km	 cross-border	 line	
hosted	 by	 Estonia	 and	 Latvia	 and	 is	 complementary	 to	 an	
internal	Estonian	 line	 (PCI	4.2.2,	discussed	next).	The	 invest-
ment	costs	are	estimated	at	113	million	euro	with	a	capex	of	102	
million	euro	for	Latvia	and	11	million	euro	for	Estonia.	
Cost allocation: Latvia	and	Estonia	agreed	to	each	pay	for	their	
own	assets,	allocating	25	million	euro	to	Latvia	and	2.8	million	
euro	to	Estonia.	They	allocate	the	remaining	75%	of	the	invest-
ment	costs	to	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.	
Motivation:	There	 is	no	net	 loser.	Latvia	and	Estonia	capture	
roughly	35%	of	all	benefits,	shared	equally	between	them.	The	
remaining	65%	of	benefits	is	captured	by	seven	other	countries	
in	 the	 region	 and,	 lacking	 a	detailed	per-country	 cost-benefit	
analysis,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 these	 benefits	 are	 shared	 equally	
among	 them.	 Following	 this	 assumption,	 none	 of	 these	 non-
hosting	countries	has	a	net	benefit	exceeding	10%.	Arguing	that	
the	other	beneficiaries	cannot	be	required	to	pay	for	the	project,	
the	financing	gap	is	allocated	to	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.
PCI 4.2.2 Estonian internal electricity line between Harku 
and Sindi (BEMIP electricity)
Project:	The	project	comprises	a	140	km	internal	line	in	Estonia.	
It	is	complementary	to	the	Latvia-Estonia	interconnector	(PCI	
4.2.1,	 discussed	 above).	The	 investment	 cost	 amounts	 to	 64	
million	euro.
Cost allocation:	Estonia	and	Latvia	agreed	to	allocate	16	mil-
lion	 euro,	 or	 25%	 of	 the	 investment	 cost	 to	 Estonia	 and	 the	
remaining	75%	to	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.
Motivation:	Estonia	has	a	positive	net	benefit,	but	the	domi-
nant	share	of	net	benefits	is	captured	in	non-hosting	countries.	
Arguing	that	the	per-country	benefits	of	the	non-hosting	coun-
tries	are	below	the	10%	threshold	and	therefore	these	Member	
States	cannot	be	required	to	pay,	part	of	the	investment	cost	is	
allocated	to	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.
PCI 4.4.1 Internal electricity line between Ventspils, Tume 
and Imanta (BEMIP electricity)
Project:	The	project	 comprises	an	 internal	 line	of	210	km	 in	
Latvia	with	an	investment	cost	of	127	million	euro.	
Cost allocation:	 Latvia	 has	 decided	 to	 include	 50%	 of	 the	
investment	cost	in	the	Latvian	transmission	tariffs.
Motivation:	 Latvia	 has	 a	 positive	 net	 benefit.	 Without	 a	
country-specific	 cost-benefit	 analysis,	 the	 net-benefits	 in	 the	
other	Member	States	 in	the	region	are	presumed	to	be	below	
the	10%	threshold,	and	therefore	these	Member	States	cannot	
be	 obliged	 to	 pay.	 Latvia	 counts	 on	 the	 Connecting	 Europe	
Facility	grants-for-works	to	cover	the	50%	financing	gap.
PCI 5.2 Gaslink twinning of the Southwest Scotland onshore 
system (NSI West Gas)
Project: The	 project	 comprises	 a	 50	 km	 reinforcement	 of	 a	
pipeline	 that	 is	physically	 located	 in	Southwest	Scotland,	but	
belongs	to	the	Irish	gas	transmission	grid.	The	investment	cost	
amounts	to	93.8	million	euro.
Cost allocation:	The	concerned	national	regulatory	authorities	
of	Ireland,	Northern	Ireland	and	Great	Britain	agreed	to	allo-
cate	100%	of	the	investment	cost	to	Ireland.
Motivation:	 Great	 Britain	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 no	 net	 loser.	
Northern	 Ireland	 argues	 that	 the	 extent	 of	 its	 benefits	 is	
uncertain	 and	 likely	 below	 the	 Agency’s	 recommended	 10%	
threshold.	For	this	reason,	 it	dismisses	the	project	promoter’s	
initial	 proposal	 for	 cost	 allocation	 that	 allocated	 12%	 of	 the	
investment	 cost	 to	 Northern	 Ireland.	 Ireland	 agrees	 that	 it	
captures	most	benefits	and	 that	 it	 should	 indeed	pay	 for	 this	
internal	project.	To	keep	the	expected	tariff	increase	for	Irish	
consumers	 at	 an	 acceptable	 level,	 Ireland	 argues	 that	 Con-
necting	Europe	Facility	grants	would	be	helpful.
PCI 5.3 Shannon LNG pipeline (NSI West Gas)
Project: The	project	comprises	a	26	km	 internal	gas	pipeline	
connecting	the	Shannon	LNG	terminal	to	the	Irish	national	gas	
grid	with	an	investment	cost	of	69	million	euro.	
Cost allocation:	 Ireland,	Northern	 Ireland	and	Great	Britain	
agreed	to	allocate	7	million	euro	to	Ireland	and	56	million	euro	
to	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility;	6	million	euro	will	be	paid	
from	Shannon	LNG	terminal	revenues.
Motivation:	There	 is	 no	 net	 loser	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 ben-
efits	are	 located	 in	 Ireland;	any	benefits	 for	Northern	 Ireland	
or	Great	 Britain	 are	 deemed	 insignificant	 following	 the	 10%	
threshold.	To	keep	the	tariff	increase	sustainable,	the	Irish	con-
tribution	 is	 limited	 to	7	million	euro	with	 the	 shortfall	 to	be	
covered	funding	from	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.	A	part	
of	 the	 commercial	 revenue	 of	 the	 Shannon	 LNG	 terminal	 is	
allocated	to	the	Shannon	gas	pipeline,	which	connects	the	ter-
minal	to	the	main	gas	system.
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PCI 5.7 Val-de-Saône gas pipeline (NSI West Gas)
Project: The	project	 comprises	 a	 220	 km	 gas	 pipeline	 and	 a	
compressor	station	hosted	in	north	east	France	to	reinforce	the	
connection	from	south	to	north.	The	investment	cost	amounts	
to	650	million	euro.	
Cost allocation: France	and	Spain	agreed	to	allocate	100%	of	
the	costs	to	France.
Motivation: There	 is	 no	net	 loser	 and	 the	 benefits	 for	 Spain	
are	 very	uncertain,	 amounting	 to	millions	 in	 some	 scenarios	
and	zero	in	other	scenarios.	France	argues	that	the	tariff	impact	
of	 the	project	will	 be	 significant	 and	 the	Connecting	Europe	
Facility	grants-for-works	could	help	to	ease	the	impact.
PCI 5.10 Reverse flow interconnection on TENP pipeline in 
Germany (NSI West Gas)
Project:	The	 project	 comprises	 enabling	 reverse	 flow	 on	 the	
existing	TENP	gas	pipeline	for	the	German	segment	between	
Wallbach	and	Bocholtz.
Cost allocation:	 Germany,	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands	
agreed	to	allocate	100%	to	Germany.	France	and	Italy	are	con-
cerned	Member	States,	but	they	declined	to	participate	in	the	
coordinated	decision.
Motivation:	There	is	no	net	loser.
PCI 5.12 Reverse flow interconnection on TENP pipeline to 
Eynatten interconnection point (NSI West Gas)
Project:	The	 project	 comprises	 enabling	 reverse	 flow	 on	 the	
existing	 TENP	 gas	 pipeline	 for	 the	 11km	 German	 segment	
towards	the	Eynatten	interconnection	point.
Cost allocation:	 Germany,	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands	
agreed	 to	allocate	100%	of	 the	costs	 to	Germany.	France	and	
Italy	are	concerned	Member	States,	but	 they	declined	to	par-
ticipate	in	the	coordinated	decision.
Motivation:	There	is	no	net	loser.
PCI 5.18 Reinforcement of the German network to Austria: 
Monaco I gas pipeline (NSI West Gas)
Project: The	project	comprises	a	90	km	pipeline	in	Germany	to	
reinforce	the	interconnection	with	Austria.
Cost allocation:	Germany	and	Austria	agreed	to	allocate	100%	
of	the	costs	to	Germany.
Motivation:	Austria	is	a	beneficiary,	but	Germany	is	not	a	net	
loser.
One project with “Loser, compensation”
PCI 8.5 Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (BEMIP Gas)
Project:	 The	 project	 comprises	 a	 534	 km	 cross-border	 gas	
pipeline	between	Poland	and	Lithuania.	The	total	 investment	
costs	amount	to	558	million	euro,	of	which	422	million	euro	is	
assigned	to	Poland	and	136	million	euro	to	Lithuania.	
Cost allocation:	Poland	and	Lithuania	did	not	reach	a	coordi-
nated	decision	within	6	months.
Agency decision8:	ACER	set	 the	compensation	 for	Poland	at	
85.8	million	euro.	The	compensation	is	split	among	the	net	ben-
eficiaries	 as	 follows:	 Lithuania	pays	 54.9	million	 euro,	 Latvia	
29.4	million	euro,	and	Estonia	1.5	million	euro.	ACER	further-
more	decided	that,	in	the	case	that	the	commercial	revenues	for	
Poland	exceed	the	expectations	of	the	market	test	in	the	appli-
cation	file,	this	additional	revenue	for	Poland	shall	first	be	used	
to	 offset	 the	 compensation	 paid	 by	 the	 beneficiary	Member	
States.	No	additional	compensation	will	be	due	if	commercial	
revenues	are	lower	than	expected.
Motivation:	The	cost-benefit	analysis	of	the	project	estimates	
the	 benefits	 to	 be	 more	 than	 twice	 as	 high	 as	 the	 costs.	 As	
per	 Member	 State,	 however,	 the	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 shows	
that	Poland	is	a	net	cost	bearer	with	a	negative	net	benefit	of	
-226.7	million	 euro,	 while	 Lithuania,	 Latvia	 and	 Estonia	 are	
net	beneficiaries	with	their	respective	net	benefits	amounting	
to	 578.8	million	 euro,	 359.1	million	 euro	 and	 118.5	million	
euro.	According	 to	 the	market	 test,	Poland	expects	 to	 record	
commercial	 revenues	 from	 capacity	 bookings	 of	 around	 140	
million	euro	with	20%	of	capacity	underwritten.	Considering	
these	commercial	revenues,	the	compensation	for	Poland	is	set	
at	85.8	million	euro.	Following	ACER’s	own	Recommendation,	
only	Member	states	that	have	significant	net	benefits	above	the	
10%	threshold	contribute	to	the	compensation	scheme.
Three projects with “No loser, compensation”
PCI 6.1.1 Poland-Czech Republic interconnection: Stork II 
(NSI West East)
Project:	The	 project	 comprises	 a	 107	 km	 bidirectional	 pipe-
line	between	Libhost	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	Kedzierzyn	in	
Poland.	The	project	is	part	of	a	cluster	of	mutually	dependent	
projects	of	common	interest	and	domestic	projects	in	Poland	
and	Czech	Republic.	The	 total	 investment	 cost	 of	 the	 cluster	
8.	 See	ACER,	2014.	Decision	of	the	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	
Regulators	No	01/2014	of	11	August	2014	on	the	investment	request	in-
cluding	cross-border	cost	allocation	for	the	Gas	Interconnection	Poland	
Lithuania	project	of	common	interest	No	8.5.
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amounts	to	648	million	euro,	of	which	391	million	euro	is	an	
investment	 in	Poland	and	257	million	euro	an	 investment	 in	
Czech	Republic.	
Cost allocation:	 Poland	 and	Czech	Republic	 agreed	 to	 each	
pay	for	the	infrastructure	on	their	respective	territories	in	com-
bination	with	a	mechanism	of	mutual	revenue	guarantees	that	
will	 be	 effective	 for	 20	 years	upon	 the	 commissioning	of	 the	
project.	A	significant	share	of	30%	of	the	costs	is	allocated	to	
the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.
Motivation: There	is	no	net	 loser.	To	 increase	the	stability	of	
the	investment	and	enhance	commitment	at	both	sides	of	the	
border,	Poland	and	Czech	Republic	mutually	guarantee	a	min-
imum	profitability	of	the	investment	in	case	the	project	returns	
insufficient	commercial	revenues.	The	market	test	indeed	indi-
cated	 an	 interest	 in	 booking	 capacity,	 but	 only	 after	 existing	
long-term	contracts	have	expired.	
PCI 8.2.3 Klaipeda-Kiemenai pipeline (BEMIP Gas)
Project:	The	project	comprises	 increasing	 the	capacity	of	 the	
internal	pipeline	between	Klaipeda	and	Kiemenai	in	Lithuania.	
The	investment	cost	amounts	to	63	million	euro	and	the	pro-
ject	is	complementary	to	the	Latvian	underground	gas	storage	
project	(PCI	8.2.4,	discussed	next).	
Cost allocation:	 Latvia	 and	 Lithuania	 agreed	 to	 allocate	 the	
costs	as	follows:	Lithuania	supplies	34	million	euro,	Latvia	con-
tributes	1.9	million	euro,	and	the	remaining	costs	are	allocated	
to	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.	
Motivation: Even	 though	 there	 is	no	net	 loser,	Latvia	argues	
that	 its	 net	 benefit	 –	 and	 synergies	with	 its	 domestic	 under-
ground	 gas	 storage	 project	 –	 justifies	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	
investment	costs	not	exceeding	1.9	million	euro	or	3%	of	invest-
ment	 cost.	The	allocation	of	 costs	 to	 the	Connecting	Europe	
Facility	is	argued	to	be	justified	by	pointing	out	the	significant	
tariff	impact	for	consumers	in	the	absence	of	grants-for-works.
PCI 8.2.4 Incukalns Underground Gas Storage (BEMIP Gas)
Project:	The	project	comprises	the	modernization	and	expan-
sion	of	the	underground	gas	storage	in	Incukalns	in	Latvia.	The	
investment	costs	amount	to	90	million	euro	and	the	project	is	
complementary	 to	 the	 Lithuanian	 internal	 pipeline	 between	
Klaipeda	and	Kiemenai	(PCI	8.2.3,	discussed	above).	
Cost allocation:	Latvia	and	Lithuania	agreed	to	the	following	
cost	allocation:	Latvia	pays	5.6	million	euro,	Lithuania	contrib-
utes	6.9	million	euro,	and	40%	of	the	investment	cost	 is	allo-
cated	 to	 the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.	The	 remaining	part	
of	 the	 budget	 is	 expected	 to	 come	 from	 commercial	 storage	
revenues.	
Motivation:	Even	though	there	is	no	net	loser,	Lithuania	argues	
that	its	net	benefit	–	and	the	synergies	with	its	domestic	pipe-
line	project	–	 justifies	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 investment	 costs	
amounting	to	6.88	million	euro	or	7.5%	of	the	investment	cost.	
This	compensation	may	be	revised	in	the	case	of	poor	imple-
mentation	of	the	project	by	Latvia.	Finally,	the	project	expects	
to	make	commercial	 revenues	which	can	be	used,	 in	part,	 to	
reduce	the	allocated	costs.
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